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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF YOUNG ADULTS IN 
LIGHT OF EVOLVING STANDARDS OF SCIENCE 
AND DECENCY: WHY OHIO SHOULD RAISE THE 
MINIMUM AGE FOR DEATH PENALTY 
ELIGIBILITY TO TWENTY-FIVE (25) 
TALIA STEWART* 
ABSTRACT 
Up until the Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Roper v. Simmons, juveniles could 
constitutionally be executed for qualifying criminal offenses. The Roper Court raised 
the minimum age for execution to eighteen, citing both a national consensus against 
executing minors, as well as recent research (at the time) showing that juveniles are 
more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures. Since Roper, the 
Supreme Court has remained silent regarding the requisite minimum age for execution 
and has left the decision up to individual states. While a slim majority of states have 
now abolished the death penalty in its entirety, Kentucky chose to retain the death 
penalty, but prohibit its use for offenders under the age of twenty-one. This Note 
proposes that Ohio, like Kentucky, raise the minimum eligibility age for execution. 
However, Ohio should raise the minimum age to twenty-five. As this Note will 
explore, compelling reasons exist for Ohio to raise the execution age to twenty-five. 
Most notably is the recent scientific research that the brain does not fully mature until 
the age of twenty-five. Additionally, there have been evolving standards of decency 
shifting public opinion away from the death penalty, national and international 
policies denouncing the use of the death penalty on youthful offenders, and case law 
supporting additional safeguards against less culpable offenders. This Note culminates 
in the proposal of an original statute to aid the Ohio legislature in amending the death 
penalty age requirement to twenty-five. To ensure that only the worst of the worst 
offenders are deprived of a second chance at life, Ohio is urged to adopt a minimum 
eligibility age of twenty-five for the death penalty.  
 
* Talia Stewart is expected to receive her Juris Doctor from Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law in May 2022. She graduated from the University of Maryland in 2019 with a Bachelor of 
Arts in Criminology and Criminal Justice. She wishes to extend her sincerest gratitude to 
everyone who supported her throughout the research and writing process, including Professor 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-two-year-old David Steffen’s upbringing can only be described in one 
word: traumatic. Steffen was the victim of brutal physical abuse, perpetrated by his 
stepfather.1 To escape the wrath of his stepfather, Steffen was sent to a Catholic school 
where he became active in a church youth group.2 There, he had normal relationships 
with women and could often be found writing poetry.3 Steffen was able to secure 
gainful employment as a door-to-door salesman of a household cleaning product,4 and 
 
1 State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 397 (Ohio 1987). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 383. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss1/7
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he was beloved by his sister, whom he zealously protected.5 It truly appeared Steffen 
created a positive life for himself into his twenties. However, the afternoon of August 
19, 1982 proved otherwise. While peddling the household cleaning products in a 
neighborhood of Cincinnati, Ohio, Steffen encountered nineteen-year-old Karen 
Range in her front yard.6 Sensing that Range was interested in purchasing cleaning 
products, Steffen demonstrated how the cleaning product worked on Range’s front 
steps and doorbell.7 Upon Range’s invitation, the pair entered the Range family home 
to further test the cleaner on indoor household surfaces.8 While demonstrating the 
product’s efficacy on the toilet, Steffen bumped up against Range’s breast,9 and Range 
began screaming.10 In an effort to silence Range’s screams, Steffen knocked her to 
the ground and cut her throat three times.11 Next, Steffen unbuttoned Range’s blouse 
in preparation to rape her; however, due to his inability to achieve an erection, Steffen 
abandoned the sexual assault and left Range bleeding out on the floor.12 Realizing that 
his employer might question his absence, Steffen contacted the police and fabricated 
a story wherein he was the victim of a robbery.13 During police questioning regarding 
the alleged robbery, Steffen initially denied involvement in the Range murder case on 
which the police were working.14 Eventually, Steffen confessed to police that he had 
killed Karen Range.15 
Steffen was indicted for and convicted of aggravated murder, rape, and aggravated 
robbery.16 The aggravated murder, with specifications that the offense was committed 
during a rape or aggravated burglary, was in violation of Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) 
§ 2903.01 and carried a death penalty specification.17 After the jury weighed the 
requisite aggravating and mitigating factors, Steffen was sentenced to death.18 The 
jury declined to consider Steffen’s youthful age as a substantial mitigating factor in its 
 
5 Id. at 397. 
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decision.19 On appeal in 1987, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Steffen’s death 
sentence and noted that it was proper for the jury to not give deference to Steffen’s 
young age.20 
David Steffen is just one of many young adults sentenced to death despite his 
young age. While Steffen’s case is a suitable illustration of young adults under twenty-
five committing capital offenses, this next offender’s case demonstrates the 
devastating effects of peer pressure on cognitively developing young adults. On 
February 12, 1992, twenty-year-old Gary Otte left Terre Haute, Indiana and drove 
overnight to Parma, Ohio to visit some friends.21 Prior to embarking on his fatal 
adventure, Otte stole his grandfather’s red 1962 Chevrolet Impala, a .22 caliber 
revolver, and two credit cards.22 Otte met his friend, J.J., at Gypsy and Rob’s, a local 
Ohio bar.23 J.J. informed Otte that he planned to “hit” a young woman for her Visa 
gold card, and an older drunk man with a lot of money.24 Both victims lived at J.J.’s 
apartment complex.25 Later that night, Otte went to the apartment complex and saw 
an older man, who appeared to have been drinking, get out of his car.26 Otte 
approached the man, Robert Wasikowski, and asked to use his phone.27 Once inside 
Wasikowski’s apartment, Otte pulled out a gun, Wasikowski offered Otte $10, and 
then Otte shot and killed Wasikowski in the head from a distance of less than two 
feet.28 Otte took $413 from Wasikowski’s wallet before returning to the bar for a night 
of drinking and doing drugs.29 
 
19 Id. at 390. Contra OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (West, Westlaw through file 48 
of the 134th General Assembly (2021-2022)) (instructing courts and jurors to consider the youth 
of an offender during a capital punishment sentencing hearing). 
20 Steffen, 509 N.E.2d at 390. For an update on Steffen’s ultimate fate, see WKRC, David 
Steffen Resentenced for 1982 Roselawn Murder, LOCAL12 (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://local12.com/news/local/david-steffen-resentenced-for-1982-roselawn-murder 
(following numerous failed appeals, new evidence recently came to light to reduce Steffen’s 
sentence. Steffen was initially convicted of raping Karen Range, and that rape charge was found 
to be an aggravated circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. However, new 
evidence showed that it was actually Kenneth Douglas, a former Hamilton County morgue 
employee, who had had sex with Range’s body. Consequently, Steffen was taken off of death 
row and his sentence was reduced to life in prison without parole). 
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The following night, Otte returned to the apartment complex to rob Sharon 
Kostura.30 Otte immediately shot Kostura in the head, stole $45 from her purse, and 
took her car keys and checkbook.31 After returning again to the bar for a night of post-
murder fun, Otte was arrested when his friends tipped off the police.32 
Otte was charged with and convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, 
and aggravated burglary for both nights’ criminal adventures.33 The aggravated 
murder charges, in violation of O.R.C. § 2903.01(A) and § 2903.01(B), each carried 
death penalty specifications.34 A three-judge panel found that the aggravating 
circumstances of these heinous crimes outweighed any mitigating circumstances, so 
Otte was sentenced to death.35 Otte unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and 
sentence several times.36 Following the issuance of two reprieves by then Ohio 
Governor, John Kasich, Otte’s execution date was set for September 13, 2017.37 
On August 21, 2017, Otte filed a lawsuit against the state of Ohio. Otte sought a 
declaration that Ohio’s death penalty statute, O.R.C. § 2929.03, violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Otte sought an 
additional declaration that the Fourteenth Amendment’s evolving standards of 
decency prohibit the execution of an offender who commits his crime while under the 
age of twenty-one.38 On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of Otte’s complaint partially because Otte relied on a Kentucky state court 
decision, Commonwealth v. Bredhold, which was not binding in Ohio.39 The Ohio 
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Otte’s death sentence because the 
United States Supreme Court did not recognize the Eighth Amendment right of 
eighteen to twenty year olds decided upon in Bredhold, as it was non-binding on Ohio 










38 Id. at 1290. 
39 Id. at 1292. See generally Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 
8792559, at *12 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017) (ordering that Kentucky’s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to offenders under the age of twenty-one). 
40 Otte, 96 N.E.3d at 1292. 
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Since the influential 2005 Supreme Court ruling in Roper v. Simmons,41 thirty 
states have declined to execute offenders who are between the ages of eighteen- and 
twenty-years-old at the time of the offense.42 This statistic is composed of states that 
have abolished the death penalty in its entirety, those with moratoria on executions, 
and the state of Kentucky.43 These thirty states demonstrate the increasingly 
recognized notion that executing an offender who was under the age of twenty-one at 
the time of his or her crimes is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. Ohio, 
however, remains firm in its stance that anyone over the age of eighteen at the time of 
the offense is eligible for capital punishment.44 
Not only should Ohio abolish the death penalty for offenders under the age of 
twenty-one, but Ohio should also prohibit the use of capital punishment for any 
offender who was under the age of twenty-five at the time of his or her offense. This 
Note will examine the history of the death penalty in America as it has been applied 
to juvenile and adult offenders and how the Supreme Court has come to eliminate 
capital punishment for its least culpable offenders. In doing so, this Note presents an 
in-depth look at Ohio’s use of its death penalty statute. Scientific research on brain 
development will be assessed in making the claim that Ohio should raise the age of its 
death penalty eligibility to twenty-five due to the lack of maturity in young adult 
offenders. Part II of this Note delves into the progression of the juvenile death penalty, 
from its origins of unrestricted execution to the modern-day rule of law prohibiting 
the execution of anyone under the age of eighteen. Part II also examines the evolution 
of Ohio’s death penalty statue since the groundbreaking United States Supreme Court 
ruling that invalidated Ohio’s then-death penalty statute.45 Part III explores the most 
compelling arguments for Ohio raising its minimum age for death penalty eligibility 
to twenty-five. The heart of this Part will focus on the neurological and psychological 
development illustrating that the human brain is not fully mature until the age of 
twenty-five, and Ohio’s readiness to use scientific research to combat any pandemic 
that adversely affects its citizens. Additionally, arguments will be made regarding the 
shifting public opinion on the integrity of capital punishment, national and 
international policy denouncing the use of the death penalty on youthful offenders, 
and the two-prong analysis conceived in Atkins to abolish the death penalty for 
mentally disabled offenders.46 Part IV proposes an original statute to aid the Ohio 
 
41 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the use of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen). 
42 Kentucky Trial Judge Rules Death Penalty Unconstitutional for Offenders Younger than 
Age 21, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/kentucky-trial-judge-rules-death-penalty-unconstitutional-
for-offenders-younger-than-age-21. 
43 Id. (Kentucky has declined to execute offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty 
since the landmark decision in Commonwealth v. Bredhold). 
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West, Westlaw through file 48 of the 134th General 
Assembly (2021-2022)); see id. § 2929.023. 
45 See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
46 See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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legislature in amending the death penalty age requirement to twenty-five. Part V 
concludes with the undeniable fact that the Ohio legislature must take swift action to 
ensure that its citizens under the age of twenty-five are not unconstitutionally 
executed. While David Steffen’s and Gary Otte’s offenses were heinous, neither a 
twenty-two-year-old offender nor a twenty-year-old offender is cognitively culpable 
enough to warrant the ultimate punishment: death. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The first documented use of the death penalty on a juvenile offender occurred in 
Plymouth Colony in 1642.47 Young Thomas Granger was indicted for buggery “with 
a mare, a cow, two goats, five sheep, two calves, and a turkey.”48 Granger was 
executed by hanging.49 Since Granger’s execution, an estimated 366 children50 have 
been executed in the United States.51 In 1786, Hannah Ocuish, a twelve-year-old 
Native American girl, was executed for killing a six-year-old child.52 In 1885, James 
Arcene, then ten years old, was executed for his involvement in a murder and 
robbery.53 In 1944, fourteen-year-old George Stinney Jr. was executed for murdering 
two girls.54 This archaic pattern of executing juveniles continued until 2005.55 The 
last juvenile to be executed was seventeen-year-old Scott Hain, who died by lethal 
injection in 2003.56 In contrast to the small amount of, but problematic, juvenile 
executions, American jurisdictions have executed about 20,000 persons total since 
Granger’s 1642 execution.57 
Use of the death penalty was scarcely restricted until 1972, when the Supreme 
Court held that the current administration of the death penalty was a violation of both 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause and the Fourteenth 
 
47 Lisa M. Lauria, Sexual Misconduct in Plymouth Colony, PLYMOUTH COLONY ARCHIVE 




50 For purposes of this article, “children” are individuals under the age of eighteen. 
51 Amy Linn, History of Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Feb. 




55 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
56 Executions of Juveniles in the U.S. 1976-2005, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2020), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/juveniles/executions-of-juveniles-since-1976. 
57 Id. 
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Amendment.58 While some of the Justices in the majority argued that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional in all aspects, some concurring Justices argued that the death 
penalty was only unconstitutional in its current administration because of its inherent 
racial bias against minority offenders.59 Nonetheless, Furman did not nullify the death 
penalty in its entirety; rather, it urged states to reform their current death penalty 
statutes if they wanted to continue executing offenders.60 
Ohio was one of many states that reformed its death penalty statute following 
Furman. Ohio’s new death penalty statute, codified in 1974, mandated the use of 
capital punishment in qualifying offenses unless the victim induced the offense, the 
defendant acted under duress or coercion, or the offender was mentally incompetent 
or psychotic.61 Following Sandra Lockett’s conviction for aggravated murder, she 
appealed the constitutionality of her death sentence, prescribed by O.R.C. § 
2929.04(B), up to the Supreme Court in 1978.62 The Supreme Court reversed 
Lockett’s death sentence because it found Ohio’s death penalty statute to be 
unconstitutionally narrow for failing to consider other necessary mitigating factors, 
such as the defendant’s character, age, record, or the circumstances of the crime.63 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockett v. Ohio, over 100 death row 
inmates’ sentences were reduced to life imprisonment.64 It was not until 1981 that 
Ohio resumed executions under a new death penalty statute enacted by the state 
legislature.65  
Ohio’s 1981 death penalty statute redefined the circumstances for sentencing 
offenders to death.66 Ohio’s new version of O.R.C. § 2929.04 prevented imposing the 
 
58 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
59 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring; Marshall, J., concurring; Stewart, J., concurring; White, J., 
concurring; Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that Justices Brennan and Marshall found the 
death penalty to be unconstitutional in relation to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in all 
instances due to its immoral nature; Justice Stewart would invalidate the use of the death penalty 
because its current use is “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed” as only a select handful of 
offenders receive capital punishment for the same offenses for which other offenders receive 
only life sentences; Justice White reasoned that the death penalty was handed down so 
infrequently that the threat of such a punishment was too attenuated to be of assistance to the 
goals of the criminal justice system; and Justice Douglas reasoned that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional in so far as it was currently administered because it was disproportionately 
handed out to black defendants). 
60 Id. (majority opinion). 
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1974) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2929.04(B) (West, Westlaw through file 48 of the 134th General Assembly (2021–2022)). 
62 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
63 Id. 
64 AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY 
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death penalty unless at least one of the following aggravating circumstances was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. The offense was the assassination of the President of the United States, 
the governor or lieutenant governor of the State, or a person in line of 
succession to or candidate for the presidency of the United States or the 
governor or lieutenant governor of the State, or a candidate for any of 
the above offices; 
2. The offense was committed for hire; 
3. The offense was committed for the purpose of escape from detention, 
apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense committed by the 
offender; 
4. The offense was committed while the offender was in a detention 
facility;  
5. Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an 
essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill 
another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons by the 
offender; 
6. The victim of the offense was a peace officer whom the offender had 
reasonable cause to know or knew to be such, and either the victim, at 
the time of the commission of the offense, was engaged in his duties or 
it was the offender’s specific purpose to kill a peace officer; 
7. The offense was committed while the offender was committing, 
attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or 
attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated 
robbery or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal 
offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the 
principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior 
calculation and design; and 
8. The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who 
was purposely killed to prevent his/[her] testimony in any criminal 
proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the 
commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim 
was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to 
an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for his/[her] testimony 
in any criminal proceeding.67 
Lockett required that in addition to considering “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense, the history, character, and background of the offender,” the following 
mitigating circumstances must be considered during a defendant’s sentencing hearing: 
1. Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated [the murder]; 
 
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.04(A)(1)–(8) (West 1981) (current version at OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2929.04(A)(1)–(8) (West, Westlaw through file 48 of the 134th General 
Assembly (2021–2022)). 
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2. Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but 
for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong 
provocation; 
3. Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of 
a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law; 
4. The youth of the offender; 
5. The offender’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions 
and delinquency adjudications; 
6. The offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal 
offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and the 
degree of the offender’s participation in the acts that led to the death of 
the victim; and 
7. Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender 
should be sentenced to death.68 
From 1973 to 2004, Ohio sentenced six juvenile offenders to death69 despite its 
newly revised death penalty statute, which considers the age of the youthful 
offender.70 The infliction of death sentences on these juvenile offenders occurred 
during a nationwide reform on the constitutionality of the death penalty, as it applied 
to juveniles.71 In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Eddings v. Oklahoma that the death 
sentence for a sixteen-year-old offender must be vacated as it was imposed without 
the consideration of individualized mitigating factors, as required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.72 In 1988, the Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld a 
 
68 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.04(B)(1)–(7) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
2929.04(B)(1)–(7) (West, Westlaw through file 48 of the 134th General Assembly (2021–
2022)) (emphasis added). 
69 VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND 
EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973–FEBRUARY 29, 2004, at 2 (2005). 
70 § 2929.04(B)(4). 
71 STREIB, supra note 69, at 2. 
72 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 
(1978)). The Petitioner in Eddings was a sixteen-year-old boy convicted of first-degree murder 
after he shot a police officer during a traffic stop. Consequently, Petitioner was sentenced to 
death. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court erred in not 
considering any mitigating factors presented, other than his youth. The Oklahoma death penalty 
statute called for the sentencing judge to consider “any mitigating circumstances,” along with 
the aggravating circumstances. Petitioner presented evidence not only of his young age, but also 
of his unsettled family history, experience with physical abuse by his father, and serious 
emotional disturbance. Nonetheless, the sentencing judge refused to consider the mitigating 
circumstances pleaded by the Petitioner. The sentencing judge found that the aggravating 
circumstances proven by the State outweighed the sole mitigating circumstance of Petitioner’s 
age. On appeal to the Supreme Court, this Court held that Petitioner’s sentence was to be 
vacated. On remand, the trial judge would be required to consider all of the individualized 
mitigating factors pleaded by the Petitioner, as this was a requirement of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss1/7
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minimum age requirement for the imposition of capital punishment.73 In Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, the court found that the execution of a juvenile under the age of sixteen 
was offensive to “civilized standards of decency” and was in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments due to a juvenile’s lower level of criminal culpability.74 
However, the constitutionality of executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders 
was reaffirmed in Stanford v. Kentucky.75 In Stanford, the Supreme Court found that 
it should not totally ban the execution of juvenile offenders because many state 
legislatures still found a societal consensus approving the use of the death penalty for 
juveniles aged sixteen to seventeen, and the court should defer to the states for criminal 
punishments.76  
In 2005, the Supreme Court finally decided that the execution of anyone under the 
age of eighteen was unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons.77 Thus, the juvenile death 
penalty was abolished nationwide. The Court used a two-pronged rationale to reach 
its conclusion. First, the Court determined that there was a national consensus against 
executing juvenile offenders because a majority of states had either outlawed the 
practice or rarely imposed the sentence.78 Second, the Court found that juvenile 
 
73 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
74 Id. at 815. Petitioner in Thompson murdered his brother-in-law because he was abusing 
Petitioner’s sister. Petitioner was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. Despite his youthful 
age, the State tried Petitioner for first-degree murder as an adult and consequently sentenced 
him to death. The State of Oklahoma defended its choice to impose the death penalty on 
Petitioner because he was tried as an adult, and thus could be punished like an adult. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court vacated Petitioner’s death sentence because the imposition of the death 
penalty on all offenders under the age of sixteen violated the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the Eighth Amendment. The categorical ban on the use of capital punishment for 
offenders under the age of sixteen was supported by the notion that “civilized standards of 
decency” have evolved to show a preference against executing these youthful offenders. 
Additionally, juveniles under the age of sixteen are less culpable because of their lower level of 
education, lower level of intelligence, and greater likelihood to be influenced by peer pressure 
and emotions. 
75 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Stanford is a combination of two cases—one 
from a Kentucky state court, and the other from a Missouri state court. In the Kentucky case, 
Petitioner was seventeen years old when he robbed a gas station, raped the attendant, and then 
murdered her to cover up the robbery and rape. Petitioner was tried as an adult and sentenced 
to death for his commission of the heinous crimes. In the Missouri case, Petitioner was sixteen 
years old when he robbed a convenience store and stabbed the store clerk to death. Petitioner 
was tried as an adult and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the 
imposition of each Petitioner’s death sentence. The Court found that there was no national 
consensus against executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders as a majority of states 
still provided for the juvenile death penalty. Ultimately, the Court believed that the decision on 
whether to execute sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders should be left up to the individual 
states. 
76 Id. 
77 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
78 Id. at 564–65. By the time Roper was decided: 
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offenders were less deserving of execution because they are “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”79 
The Court added that “juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over 
their own environment.”80 Given those considerations, the Court found it appropriate 
to ban the imposition of the death penalty on those juvenile offenders who, because of 
“their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate 
surroundings,” had a “greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape 
negative influences” in their environment.81 As an individual’s cognitive functions are 
not fully developed by the age of eighteen, the Court had difficulty concluding that 
“even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved 
character.”82 
When Roper was decided, only 21 states still authorized the execution of a juvenile 
offender,83 thus showing that the majority of state legislatures already disapproved of 
executing their youngest offenders. Ohio was one of the many states that had raised 
the minimum age for execution to eighteen prior to Roper.84 Nationwide, 72% of 
citizens in 2002 supported the use of the death penalty in general, but only 26% 
supported its use for juveniles convicted of murder.85 In comparison, in October 2019, 
60% of the nation preferred that the sentence for murder be life imprisonment without 
parole, rather than the death penalty.86  
 
30 States prohibit[ed] the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the 
death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial 
interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach . . . . [I]n the 20 States without a formal 
prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent. Since Stanford, six 
States have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years 
[1995-2005], only three have done so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Id. 
79 Id. at 569; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (holding that “[e]ven 
the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult”). 
80 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by 
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1014 (2004) (“As legal minors, [juveniles] lack the 
freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.”). 
81 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
82 Id. 
83 STREIB, supra note 69, at 7. 
84 Id. 
85 Public Opinion Regarding the Juvenile Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/public-opinion-regarding-the-juvenile-death-penalty (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
86 Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2020) [hereinafter GALLUP]; Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Now Support Life in 
Prison over Death Penalty, GALLUP (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/268514/americans-support-life-prison-death-penalty.aspx. 
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It is evident that the American public has changed its view on capital punishment. 
Accordingly, to ensure that only the most culpable offenders are sentenced to death, 
the Ohio legislature should abolish the death penalty for those offenders younger than 
twenty-five. In determining the proper age for imposition of the death penalty, Ohio 
should examine not only the abundance of scientific research indicating that 
neurological adulthood begins at twenty-five, but also considers both public opinion 
and national and international policies when determining how to best enact death-
penalty reform.  
III. COMPELLING REASONS FOR OHIO TO RAISE ITS MINIMUM AGE FOR DEATH PENALTY 
ELIGIBILITY TO TWENTY-FIVE 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper,87 the minimum eligibility age for 
the death penalty has remained at eighteen.88 However, this Note argues that Roper is 
flawed, and proposes that Ohio limit its usage to offenders over the age of twenty-five 
rather than prohibit the use of the death penalty in its entirety. Such a novel shift in 
legislation is supported not only by general changes in the public’s opinion on capital 
punishment, but also by international policy, national policy resolutions, precedent set 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and recent research in neurological and 
psychological development suggesting that the brain does not fully mature until the 
age of twenty-five.89 When judges and juries sentence offenders to death, the most 
permanent punishment of all, it is imperative that the offenders’ crimes are of the most 
extreme circumstances, and that the offenders are beyond all hope for rehabilitation.  
While many people believe that capital punishment is a deterrent to future crime, 
there is no credible data behind this contention. 90 States that impose the death penalty 
 
87 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
88 See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
1, 2017) (explaining that the minimum eligibility age for the death penalty has remained at 
eighteen for all death penalty states except for Kentucky, which outlawed the execution of 
offenders under the age of twenty-one in 2017). See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding 
executions of persons under eighteen at the time of the offense unconstitutional). 




%20until%20the%20age%2025; Public Opinion Regarding the Juvenile Death Penalty, supra 
note 85; Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds from 
the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 144 n.27 (2016); AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 111 (Feb. 2018), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/policy/2018_mm_111.pdf; 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (affirming constitutionality of the death penalty); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting execution of individuals under 
the age of sixteen at the time of the offense); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (prohibiting execution of 
individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense). Precedent evidences that the 
Supreme Court revisited the age issue before and raised the minimum age requirement. 
90 The Death Penalty: Questions and Answers, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/death-penalty-questions-and-answers-september-
2011?redirect=files/pdfs/capital/2007_deathpen_questionsanswers.pdf. 
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do not have lower crime rates or murder rates than non-death-penalty jurisdictions.91 
Moreover, the threat of execution serves no deterrent effect because many offenders 
do not rationalize before they act, as a vast majority of murders are committed in the 
heat of passion, under drugs and/or alcohol, or under the guise of mental illness.92 
Thus, no recognized objective of criminal punishment, other than incapacitation, is 
achieved by sentencing an offender to death. Do we really want to inflict such a 
permanent punishment on young adults, who are often influenced by external factors 
when committing crimes and still have their whole lives ahead of them to rehabilitate?  
Urging a state legislature to amend its death penalty statute to exclude offenders 
under the age of twenty-five is a ground-breaking idea as nearly all raise-the-age 
proposals urge a minimum age of twenty-one.93 However, these proposals do not 
extend to an age old enough to meet their stated purpose. If the purpose is to keep up 
with “evolving standards of decency”94 regarding the potential cruel and unusual 
nature of capital punishment, states should utilize all of their resources—not just what 
various international and national policy groups are recommending, but also what 
psychologists and other scientists have proven. The history of the death penalty 
demonstrates that it has repeatedly evolved to prohibit certain offenders from falling 
within its dominion based on their young age.95 Prior to the decision in Roper, 
relatively little scientific research existed to support the court’s premise that juveniles 
are less mature than adults. Now that there is an abundance of research supporting the 
biological differentiation between those over and under the age of twenty-five, Ohio 











93 See generally Bredhold, 2017 WL 8792559; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION , supra note 89; 
American Bar Association Resolution: Ban Death Penalty for Offenders Age 21 or Younger, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/american-bar-
association-resolution-ban-death-penalty-for-offenders-age-21-or-younger; New Neuroscience 
Research Suggests Age Limit for Death-Penalty Eligibility May be Too Low, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/new-neuroscience-research-
suggests-age-limit-for-death-penalty-eligibility-may-be-too-low; Michaels, supra note 89, at 
165. 
94 Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
95 See supra Part II. 
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A. Eighteen Is an Arbitrary Cutoff Age Because Scientific Research Shows 
That No Biological Difference Exists Between an Individual Over Eighteen and an 
Individual Just Shy of Eighteen 
“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an 
individual turns 18.”96 As Justice Kennedy opined, once the clock strikes midnight on 
an individual’s eighteenth birthday, that person is not automatically granted new 
wisdom. He or she is the same adolescent with the same immature mindset as he or 
she had just one day prior. So why have the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the Ohio legislature implemented an arbitrary age of eighteen as the minimum age for 
capital punishment? No evidence exists that a seventeen-year-old offender should be 
set apart from his eighteen-year-old counterpart developmentally. The only apparent 
difference is legally-based—the government granting legal majority to those over the 
age of eighteen. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper— which stated the death penalty was 
unconstitutional for those offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time of 
their offense—contradicts his notion that the difference between juveniles and adults 
does not appear overnight.97 Justice Kennedy briefly described how those under the 
age of eighteen were less morally culpable because they were more susceptible to peer 
pressure, less able to understand the consequences associated with their actions, and 
less able to control their impulses.98 However, the court omitted one crucial word from 
its opinion: “brain.”99  
1. Neurological Research: The Prefrontal Cortex Is Not Mature Until the Age 
of Twenty-Five 
In the United States, the age of eighteen is commonly used to separate adolescents 
from adults. Eighteen is the age at which an individual can legally vote, enlist in the 
military, marry without parental consent, and make all legal decisions for oneself. 
However, a growing number of scientists suggest that this is an arbitrary age to 
distinguish adults from adolescents because the human brain is not fully developed 
until the age of twenty-five.100 Apryl Alexander, a professor of psychology at the 
University of Denver, explained that the scientific consensus is that most human brains 
are not fully developed until the age of twenty-five.101 Due to the conflict of what 
society deems to be adulthood (i.e., age eighteen), and the new scientific research that 
adulthood actually begins at twenty-five, members of the scientific community have 
 
96 Id. at 574. Justice Kennedy articulates that the legal standard to differentiate juveniles from 
adults is recognized to be eighteen, and that society has attributed many rights to those over the 
age of eighteen, while it has shielded those under the age of eighteen from certain acts. 
97 Id. at 572–74, 578. 
98 Id. at 569–70. 
99 New Neuroscience Research Suggests Age Limit for Death-Penalty Eligibility May be Too 
Low, supra note 93. 
100 Cox, supra note 89. 
101 Maria Cramer, When Are You Really an Adult?, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/us/usa-legal-age.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2020). 
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advocated for reforming the criminal justice system in the area of punishing young 
adult offenders.102 As Warren Binford, professor of law at Willamette University, has 
pointed out, the conflicting standards have led to confusion on what young adults 
should and should not be allowed to do since they are known to use less restraint and 
discipline than their older adult counterparts.103  
When the Supreme Court decided Roper, scientists did not have a thorough 
understanding of the extent to which adolescent brains differed from adult brains. 
When the American Bar Association (“A.B.A.”) adopted its resolution to end capital 
punishment for offenders under the age of twenty-one,104 the A.B.A. reiterated that 
“there is a growing medical consensus that key areas of the brain relevant to decision-
making and judgment continue to develop into the early twenties.”105 Brain 
development studies show that the areas of the brain responsible for planning, 
judgment, impulse control, and decision making are still maturing throughout late 
adolescence.106 Thus, there is good reason to suppose that adolescents are “more 
susceptible to influence, less future oriented, less risk averse, and less able to manage 
their impulses and behavior . . . .”107  
Researchers have found that the last portion of the brain to develop is the frontal 
lobe.108 The frontal lobe is divided into two systems: the prefrontal cortex and the 
limbic system.109 While the latter controls a person’s fight-or-flight response, the 
prefrontal cortex is tasked with “reasoning, planning, and impulsivity.”110 Because 
these two systems develop at different rates, an imbalance exists in the adolescent 
brain that leads to excess emotionality and vulnerability.111 “It seems clear that 
teenagers are simply not as capable as adults at inhibiting behavior.”112  
A longitudinal study of brain development, conducted by Dr. Jay Giedd and 
sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, followed 5,000 adolescents and 




104 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 89. 
105 American Bar Association Resolution: Ban Death Penalty for Offenders Age 21 or 
Younger, supra note 93. 
106 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 80, at 1013. 
107 Id. 
108 Brooke Troutman, A More Just System of Juvenile Justice: Creating a New Standard of 
Accountability for Juveniles in Illinois, 108 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 203 (2018). 
109 Id.; see ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE 
CIVILIZED MIND 23 (2001). 
110 Troutman, supra note 108, at 203–04. 
111 Kevin Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile 
Punishment, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 351 (2013). 
112 Id. 
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five.113 While the study was meant to conclude upon each participant’s sixteenth 
birthday, Dr. Giedd repeatedly extended the conclusion of the study because he found 
that the participants’ brains were still changing at each subsequent examination.114 
The most noteworthy changes occurred in the prefrontal cortex and the cerebellum—
two areas of the brain known for emotional control and cognitive function.115 Dr. 
Giedd, astounded at the results of his study, joked that “[t]he only people who got this 
right were the car-rental companies,”116 who prohibit the rental of a car to anyone 
under the age of twenty-five, or charge astronomically higher rates than for older 
adults.117 
The prefrontal cortex in those under the age of twenty-five is particularly deficient 
in two ways.118 First, the brain’s gray matter is not fully developed until the mid-
twenties.119 Gray matter is a compilation of brain cells that assist in the brain’s higher 
functions.120 While one would expect an increase in gray matter to advance the level 
of brain maturity, the opposite is true. Gray matter is at its maximum between the ages 
of ten and twenty years old, and only through pruning, does the amount of gray matter 
diminish.121 Scientist Phillip Shaw, Dr. Giedd’s colleague, opined that the brain’s 
gray matter has “completed its most dramatic structural change by age 25,”122 thus 
demonstrating the ongoing maturity of the prefrontal cortex well into the mid-
twenties. Second, the brain’s white matter is also not fully developed until the mid-
twenties.123 White matter is the brain tissue that oversees communication between 
several areas of the brain.124 Myelin, a component of white matter, coats the brain’s 
axons in an attempt to ease the cross-brain communication in a process known as 
 
113 Michaels, supra note 89 (emphasis added). 




117 Michaels, supra note 89. 
118 Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n and the Am. Acad. of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 18, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-
7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for the A.M.A.]. 
119 Id. at 20. 
120 Id. at 19. 
121 Id. at 19–20. 
122 Henig, supra note 114. 
123 Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of Human Brain 
Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10937, 10939 fig. 2 
(2011). 
124 Brief for the A.M.A., supra note 118, at 22. 
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myelination.125 Myelination, when incomplete, can lead to young adults becoming 
more susceptible to peer pressure.126 Studies have shown a positive correlation 
between “self-regulatory abilities” and the presence of white matter from 
myelination.127 
Neuroscientist Dr. Sandra Aamodt contends that the maturity of an adolescent’s 
brain begins during puberty, but by the time an individual is eighteen, his brain is only 
about halfway developed.128 Not only is the prefrontal cortex not fully developed at 
age eighteen, but the brain’s reward system129 is highly active throughout puberty and 
does not decline to its final level until the age of twenty-five.130 Young adults may be 
more vulnerable to peer pressure due to this increase in the activity of the reward 
system.131 Dr. Aamodt’s research concluded that “a 20 year old is 50 percent more 
likely to do something risky if two friends are watching than if he’s alone.”132 
Christopher Simmons, the respondent in Roper, was seventeen-years-old when he 
committed a first degree murder that resulted in the death penalty.133 Prior to killing 
Mrs. Shirley Crook, Simmons expressed to his two friends, Charles Benjamin and 
John Tessmer, then aged fifteen and sixteen respectively, that he wanted to murder 
someone.134 Simmons described his dream murder plan to his friends and assured 
them that he would not get in trouble because he was just a kid.135 After murdering 
Mrs. Crook (by tying her hands and feet together, throwing her off a bridge, and 
leaving her in the water below to drown), Simmons went around school bragging about 
the killing and telling all his friends about his “grand” night.136 The behavior exhibited 
by Simmons is evidence that young adults are easily influenced by their peers and are 




127 Id. at 24. 
128 Cox, supra note 89. 
129 In simplified terms, the brain’s reward system refers to neurological structures that are 
activated with rewarding or reinforcing stimuli. When the brain is exposed to such stimuli, it 
responds by ramping up production of dopamine. Know Your Brain: Reward System, 
NEUROSCIENTIFICALLY CHALLENGED (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://neuroscientificallychallenged.com/posts/know-your-brain-reward-system. 
130 Cox, supra note 89. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 557. 
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Simmons’s two friends greatly increased the odds that he would engage in the criminal 
behavior.137 
2. Psychological Research: Young Adults Under the Age of Twenty-Five are 
More Vulnerable to Peer Pressure and Risky Behaviors 
In the last twenty years, scientists have explored the diminished culpability of 
young adult offenders in more depth. Dr. Laurence Steinberg, a psychologist and 
professor at Temple University, found that young adults are unable to anticipate future 
consequences as well as older adults.138 This study observed 935 people between the 
ages of ten and thirty.139 The results showed that those aged eighteen to twenty-one 
and twenty-two to twenty-five had a statistically lower ability to anticipate future 
consequences than those between the ages of twenty-six and thirty.140 In a study 
conducted by Dr. Kathryn Lynn Modecki, it was shown that no statistical difference 
exists in the temperance (“the ability to evaluate a situation before acting”141) of those 
aged fourteen to seventeen, eighteen to twenty-one, and twenty-two to twenty-
seven.142 However, a statistically significant difference in temperance exists between 
those adolescents and young adults compared to older adults ages twenty-eight to 
forty,143 with the latter having more of an ability to evaluate a situation before acting. 
Thus, there is a greater similarity in temperance between those fourteen to twenty-five 
years of age compared to older adults in their thirties. Accordingly, young adults 
between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five have the same ability (or lack thereof) 
to ponder the future implications of their actions as do those under the age of eighteen. 
Nonetheless, Ohio only views those under the age of eighteen as deficient in this 
critical cognitive skill. This disparity is only one of many reasons why Ohio’s current 
death penalty statute—authorizing execution for anyone over eighteen—is flawed and 
needs reform.  
Peer influence, as described above with respect to Christopher Simmons’s easy 
decision to engage in killing,144 runs high in adolescents and young adults. One study 
of 380 young adults aged eighteen to twenty-five found that “antisocial peer pressure 
was a highly significant . . . predictor of . . . total recklessness . . . .”145 Some 
 
137 Cox, supra note 89. 
138 Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 
80 CHILD DEV. 28, 35 (2009). 
139 Id. at 32. 
140 Id. at 35. 
141 Michaels, supra note 89, at 162. 
142 Kathryn L. Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age 
Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78, 81–82, 85 (2008). 
143 Id. at 82, 85. 
144 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005). 
145 Graham Bradley & Karen Wildman, Psychosocial Predictors of Emerging Adults’ Risk 
and Reckless Behaviors, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 253, 257, 263 (2002). 
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psychologists suggest that just as “coercion or duress is a mitigating factor,” peer 
pressure should lessen culpability.146  
In particular, peer pressure can run rampant in gang involvement.147 Juveniles and 
young adults are often pressured by antisocial peer influences to join gangs.148 The 
age demographic of gangs further supports the theory that young adults under the age 
of twenty-five can be heavily influenced by their peers. The National Youth Gang 
Survey found that young adults aged eighteen to twenty-four comprised 37% of gang 
members in the United States.149 In contrast, those ages fifteen to seventeen made up 
only 34% of gang members and those under the age of fifteen accounted for only 16% 
of gang members.150 Gang members over twenty-five accounted for merely 13% of 
gang members.151 While gang involvement certainly leads to violent crime, it is 
important to consider one of the main reasons why youths and young adults join gangs: 
peer pressure.152 An analysis of the demographic of gang membership clearly 
indicates that young adults under the age of twenty-five are still heavily influenced by 
the antisocial pressure of their peers. Those over the age of twenty-five have 
statistically significant lower rates of gang membership because they are less at risk 
of being influenced by negative peers to engage in reckless behavior.153 Both the 
scientific studies previously discussed and the surveys of gang membership support a 
notion that young-adult gang members are not as morally culpable due to the external 
influences involved in committing group offenses.  
Justice Kennedy articulated in Roper that the personality traits of a juvenile “are 
more transitory [and] less fixed.”154 Relatively few juvenile offenders will continue 
this pattern of committing criminal offenses into adulthood, as for most juveniles, 
“risky or antisocial behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity . . . .”155 The Court 
found that the evolving nature of juveniles implied higher potential for reform and 
 
146 Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RSCH. NETWORK ON 
ADOLESCENT DEV. AND JUV. JUST. 1, 3 (2005), https://ccoso.org/sites/default/files/import/Less-
guilty-by-reason-of-adolesence.pdf. 
147 Pressures of Gang Affiliation on Youth, MST SERVS. (Oct. 2, 2018, 2:40 PM), 
https://info.mstservices.com/blog/pressures-of-gang-affiliation-on-youth. 
148 Id. 





152 Pressures of Gang Affiliation on Youth, supra note 147. 
153 Bradley & Wildman, supra note 145, at 263; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, supra note 149. 
154 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
155 Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, supra note 80, at 1014). 
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diminished culpability.156 Similarly, since it is now known that offenders up to the 
age of twenty-five have a lower ability to anticipate future consequences, have less 
temperance, and are more susceptible to peer pressure, punishment should be no 
different for these young adult offenders than for juvenile offenders. For the same 
reasons that Roper found the death penalty unconstitutional for those under eighteen, 
the Ohio legislature should rewrite the law to prohibit the death penalty as 
unconstitutional for those offenders under the age of twenty-five.  
The death penalty is reserved for “those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category 
of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most 
deserving of execution.’”157 While Simmons’s, Steffen’s, and Otte’s crimes were 
certainly heinous and they deserve to be punished for murdering innocent people, their 
lack of brain development arguably makes them less culpable and less deserving of 
capital punishment than an older adult offender with a matured brain. The Ohio 
legislature should not disregard the new, modern research proving the lessened 
culpability of offenders under the age of twenty-five. Since scientists now realize that 
the brain is not fully developed until age twenty-five,158 rather than age eighteen, the 
Ohio legislature should take this neurological and psychological research into account 
in considering a new death penalty statute that would raise the minimum age for such 
punishment to twenty-five.  
3. In the Midst of the Global Coronavirus Pandemic, Ohio Has Emerged as a 
National Leader in Responses Based on Scientific Reliance 
Listening to science is nothing new for Ohio. In March of 2020, when the 
coronavirus pandemic first emerged in the United States, Ohio was the pioneer in 
coronavirus response tactics.159 Ohio Governor Mike DeWine was quick to respond 
to the impending threat of the coronavirus by shutting down public gatherings and 
schools.160 The Governor’s reasoning? “We’re basing this on science.”161 This then-
dramatic response to the coronavirus pandemic came about in mid-March 2020 when 
there were only three confirmed cases of the virus in the entire state.162 Ohio imposed 
broad restrictions on its citizens when so few cases and such little scientific research 
existed (at the time). In contrast, an abundance of scientific research exists on the 
delayed neurological and psychological maturation of young adults, and how this can 
 
156 Id. at 570–71. 
157 Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
158 Cox, supra note 89. 
159 Jessie Balmert & Jackie Borchardt, ‘We’re Basing this on Science’: Ohio Emerges as 
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increase the propensity to commit criminal offenses. Thus, it is not senseless to think 
that Ohio should raise the age of eligibility for its death penalty punishment. Unlike 
when Governor DeWine shut down the state in mid-March, an abundance of scientific 
research exists showing that young adults under the age of twenty-five do not have the 
requisite brain maturity and cognitive skills to be as culpable for their poor criminal 
decisions as mature adults. When Governor DeWine began issuing harsh coronavirus 
restrictions on Ohioans in March 2020, 80% of Ohio citizens approved of the 
Governor’s response to the pandemic.163 Not only would Ohio now have much more 
scientific support to reform its death penalty statute than it did when issuing 
coronavirus restrictions, but it will also have a great deal of public support if it takes 
a firm stance and uses reliable scientific research to improve its death penalty 
standpoint. Ohio should once again be a pioneer in affecting national policy and 
reform its death penalty statute to exclude offenders under the age of twenty-five from 
state execution.  
B. Public Opinion is Shifting Away from Supporting the Death Penalty in All 
Instances 
The citizens of the United States have always had differing views regarding 
whether they support the death penalty.164 In October 2020, only 55% of people were 
in favor of sentencing a convicted murderer to death.165 This is a decrease in 15 
percentage points from 2002.166 In our modern day society, nearly half of the U.S. has 
lost faith in the benefits of the death penalty and now objects to it as a punishment 
entirely.167 This differing view amongst U.S. citizens accurately reflects the divide 
amongst the U.S. states on the constitutionality of the death penalty. Currently, the 
country is essentially evenly divided amongst death penalty states and non-death 
penalty states. While 27 states and the federal government authorize the use of the 
death penalty, three of those states—California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—have 
gubernatorial moratoria on the use of capital punishment.168 A gubernatorial 
moratoria essentially prohibits the use of the death penalty, but does so under the 
governor’s authority, rather than by state legislation.169 This means that in practice, 
 
163 Tyler Carey, Poll: Nearly 80% of Ohioans Approve of Gov. DeWine’s Response to the 








168 States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty. 
169 Hadar Aviram, Death Penalty Moratorium in California – What it Means for the State 
and for the Nation, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 20, 2019), https://theconversation.com/death-
penalty-moratorium-in-california-what-it-means-for-the-state-and-for-the-nation-113634. 
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only 24 states are willing to execute a convicted felon, while 26 states plus the District 
of Columbia are unwilling to do so.170 For the first time since Roper, a majority of 
states prohibit the execution of anyone under the age of twenty-one. Kentucky, a death 
penalty-eligible state, officially ruled the death penalty to be unconstitutional in 2017 
for those under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense.171 Kentucky’s partial 
restriction based on age now brings the total to 27 states, plus the District of Columbia, 
which presently outlaw capital punishment for offenders younger than twenty-one.172 
With a majority of states now opposed to capital punishment not only for minors, but 
also for those under the age of twenty-one, it is time for Ohio to step up and raise its 
minimum age for death-penalty eligibility.  
While Kentucky suggests twenty-one to be the minimum eligibility age for the 
death penalty, this standard is still premature. As previously mentioned, Justice 
Kennedy did not believe that the qualities differentiating seventeen-year-olds from 
eighteen-year-olds disappeared overnight.173 As we now know from contemporary 
scientific research, not only is there not a statistically significant neurological or 
cognitive difference between seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds, but this difference is 
also not apparent when comparing those under eighteen and under twenty-one with 
those under twenty-five years of age.174 Thus, Ohio should strive to start a precedent 
that is based on reliable research, in addition to public opinion, when reforming its 
death penalty statute to prohibit executing those under the age of twenty-five.  
C. International and National Policy Recommendations Call for an End to Capital 
Punishment for the Least Culpable Offenders, Defined by Their Age 
On November 20, 1989, the United Nations presented the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.175 This Treaty called for the condemnation of “torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” including “capital 
punishment” and “life imprisonment without possibility of release” for “offenses 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”176 Every member of the United 
Nations has ratified this treaty except for the United States.177 Even countries which 
are notorious for their lack of human rights, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and South 
 
170 States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 168. 
171 Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 
2017). 
172 States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 168. 
173 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
174 Cox, supra note 89. 
175 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
176 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
177 Convention on the Rights of the Child New York, 20 Nov. 1989, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION (Aug. 27. 2021), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4 
[hereinafter Convention]. 
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Sudan,178 have ratified this treaty.179 Despite the United States’ eventual ban on the 
death penalty—by judicial order—for those under the age of eighteen, Congress has 
still yet to ratify this treaty.180 Meanwhile, 195 other United Nations member states 
have approved of this treaty.181 Does the United States really want to be equated in its 
lack of human rights for juveniles to some of the most backward-looking and 
inhumane countries?  
In 2018, the American Bar Association, the most “trusted voice of America’s legal 
profession,”182 approved Resolution 111, which urged every state that still authorizes 
the death penalty to prohibit the usage of such on any felon who was under the age of 
twenty-one at the time of the criminal offense.183 The A.B.A.’s conclusion gathered 
support from many different fields, including the recent advances in adolescent brain 
development research, the lesser moral culpability for adolescents, and evolving 
societal views.184 The A.B.A. found that because of these older adolescents’ “ongoing 
neurological development,” they are “not among the worst-of-the-worst offenders, for 
whom the death penalty must be reserved.”185 A similar resolution was adopted by 
the A.B.A. at its 1983 Annual Meeting, whereby the association called for a ban on 
the death penalty for any person under the age of eighteen.186 While it was roughly 
two decades before the Supreme Court adopted the views of the 1983 A.B.A. 
members,187 one can be hopeful that the Ohio legislature will listen to the A.B.A.’s 
2018 resolution and take it into consideration in a more timely manner, unlike the 
highest court’s undue delay of such consideration. Along with considering the 
A.B.A.’s 2018 resolution, Ohio should review all of the latest scientific research 
 
178 Daniel Brown, The 25 Countries in the World with the Least Amount of Freedom, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/25-countries-with-least-amount-of-
freedom. 
179 Convention, supra note 177. 
180 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the use of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen); see Convention, 
supra note 177. 
181 Convention, supra note 177. 
182 William C. Hubbard, Respect and Influence: The ABA’s Voice is Strengthened by 
Members’ Efforts, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2015, 6:15 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/respect_and_influence_the_abas_voice_is_stren
gthened_by_members_efforts. 
183 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIOn, supra note 89. 
184 Id. at 6, 8, 10–11. 
185 Id. at 13. 
186 William W. Greenhalgh, ABA House of Delegates Recommendation, A.B.A. (1983), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/resources/dp-
policy/juvenile-dp-1983/. 
187 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
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concluding that the human brain does not fully mature until the age of twenty-five and 
the legislative proposal presented later in this Note.  
D. The Two-Pronged Analysis in Atkins v. Virginia Mirrors the Most 
Compelling Reasons to Discontinue the Use of the Death Penalty for Offenders 
Under the Age of Twenty-Five 
While the juvenile justice movement lobbied to abolish the juvenile death penalty, 
the Supreme Court focused on abolishing the imposition of the death penalty for those 
with mental disabilities.188 Two significant reasons existed for the Court’s 2002 
decision to discontinue capital punishment for this category of offenders. First, the 
Court found that many states were no longer executing those with mental 
disabilities.189 By 2002, twenty-one death penalty states and the federal government 
had abolished the death penalty for those with mental disabilities. The few remaining 
death penalty states rarely imposed this ultimate punishment on its mentally disabled 
citizens.190 “The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that 
a national consensus has developed against it.”191 Second, the Court found that 
executing those individuals with mental disabilities will not further “the deterrent or 
the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”192 Moreover, these individuals tend to 
have disabilities in the areas of “reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses” 
 
188 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Petitioner was convicted of abduction, 
armed robbery, and first-degree murder. Consequently, Petitioner was sentenced to death. Id. at 
307. At the sentencing hearing, Petitioner introduced evidence to show that he was mentally 
disabled because he had an IQ of 59. Id. at 309. Despite Petitioner’s low IQ score, the State 
contended that Petitioner was still deserving of capital punishment. Id. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on those with mental disabilities was 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. Id. at 321. 
189 Id. In 1986, Georgia became the first state to prohibit the execution of those with mental 
disabilities. Id. at 313–14. The federal government followed suit in 1988, with Maryland trailing 
close behind in 1989. Id. at 314.  
In 1990 Kentucky and Tennessee enacted statutes similar to those in Georgia and 
Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991, and Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, 
Indiana, and Kansas in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, when New York reinstated its death 
penalty, it emulated the Federal Government by expressly exempting the mentally 
retarded. Nebraska followed suit in 1998 . . . . [I]n 2000 and 2001 six more states—
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina—joined 
the procession. The Texas Legislature unanimously adopted a similar bill, and bills 
have passed at least one house in other States, including Virginia and Nevada . . . .  
Id. at 314–15. 
190 Id. “Some States, for example New Hampshire and New Jersey, continue to authorize 
executions [for the mentally disabled], but none have been carried out in decades.” Id. at 316. 
The Court went on to discuss that even in the states which “have no prohibition with regard to 
the mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less than 70 . . 
. .” since 1989. Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 321. 
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and thus “do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most 
serious adult criminal conduct.”193 The Court ultimately arrived at the conclusion that 
since those with mental disabilities are less morally culpable due to their 
underdeveloped cognitive skills, the goals of the death penalty (i.e., deterrence and 
retribution) will not be fulfilled by executing this population of offenders. 
Similarly, as noted in Part III. B., offenders under the age of twenty-one are already 
not subject to execution in a majority of states,194 either because the state finds the 
execution of this category of youthful offender against evolving standards of decency, 
or because the state has a comprehensive ban on the use of capital punishment. Thus, 
the rarity of executing those under the age of twenty-one demonstrates that a growing 
national consensus exists against executing these younger offenders. Additionally, as 
was discussed in Part III. A., those under the age of twenty-five are less morally 
culpable due to their underdeveloped cognitive skills. At the heart of Atkins was a 
focus on the deficient cognitive development of mentally disabled offenders. 
Likewise, this Note proposes that those under the age of twenty-five are similarly 
wanting in their cognitive abilities when weighing the pros and cons of committing a 
criminal offense. Thus, a direct parallel exists between the Atkins Court’s reasoning in 
abolishing the death penalty for individuals with mental disabilities and the need for 
Ohio to abolish the death penalty for individuals under the age of twenty-five.  
IV. A NEW STATUTORY PROPOSAL FOR THE OHIO STATE LEGISLATURE 
The current statute governing the usage of capital punishment in Ohio is outdated 
and is in dire need of reform. Section 2929.023 of the Ohio Revised Code states, 
A person charged with aggravated murder and one or more specifications of 
an aggravating circumstance may, at trial, raise the matter of his age at the 
time of the alleged commission of the offense and may present evidence at 
trial that he was not eighteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged 
commission of the offense. The burdens of raising the matter of age, and of 
going forward with the evidence relating to the matter of age, are upon the 
defendant. After a defendant has raised the matter of age at trial, the 
prosecution shall have the burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the 
alleged commission of the offense.195  
O.R.C. § 2929.023 places the burden of raising the matter of age on the defendant 
to assert that he or she was under the age of eighteen and is thus not fit for the 
punishment of death. Rather than the defendant raising the argument that he or she 
was under the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, 
this Note seeks to reform the statute as follows: 
A person charged with aggravated murder and one or more specifications of 
an aggravating circumstance may, at trial, raise the matter of his or her age 
 
193 Id. at 306. 
194 States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 168. 
195 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.023 (West, West, Westlaw through file 48 of the 134th 
General Assembly (2021–2022)). 
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at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and may present 
evidence at trial that he or she was not twenty-five years of age or older at 
the time of the alleged commission of the offense. The burdens of raising the 
matter of age, and of going forward with the evidence relating to the matter 
of age, are upon the defendant. The prosecution shall have the burden of 
proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in fact 
over the age of twenty-five at the time of the alleged commission of the 
offense. 
The proposed statute is unique, revolutionary, and absolutely necessary.196 It may 
take time for the Ohio legislature to come around to this innovative proposal. 
Therefore, if Ohio declines to raise the minimum age to twenty-five, this Note 
proposes that the statute containing the aggravating and mitigating factors be 
amended. Specifically, this Note advocates for altering O.R.C. § 2929.04(A). This 
provision currently provides that the “imposition of the death penalty for aggravated 
murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment 
or count in the indictment . . . and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”197 This Note 
suggests that this provision be modified so as to ensure that only the “worst of the 
worst”198 offenders are sentenced to such a severe sanction on their life and liberty. A 
modern version of this provision should read as follows: the imposition of the death 
penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless two or more of the following are 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, at trial, by the prosecution. This altered version 
of O.R.C. § 2929.04(A) requires two of the aggravating factors to be present,199 rather 
than just one, and for them to both be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
prosecution. If Ohio continues to execute offenders under the age of twenty-five, it 
needs to be confident in its decision to inflict such a harsh penalty.  
The last aspect of Ohio’s death penalty statute instructs “the court, trial jury, or 
panel of three judges” to consider and weigh several mitigating factors against the 
 
196 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005); Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-
CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra 
note 89, at 8; AMNESTY INT’L, THE EXCLUSION OF CHILD OFFENDERS FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2003); Extending Roper: Is 18 Too Young?, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/juveniles/extending-roper (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2021). 
197 § 2929.04(A). 
198 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 13. 
199 § 2929.04(A)(1)–(10) (Ohio has modified the list of aggravating factors in its death 
penalty statute since its overhaul in 1981. Specifically, Ohio has added two more aggravating 
factors to the list: “(9) the offender, in the commission of the offense, purposefully caused the 
death of another who was under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the 
offense, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the offense or, 
if not the principal offender, committed the offense with prior calculation and design[; and] (10) 
the offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing 
immediately after committing or attempting to commit terrorism.” Additionally, Ohio has 
slightly modified the wording in provisions (A)(1)–(8), but the underlying principals remain the 
same as they did in the 1981 version). 
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established aggravating factor.200 Not surprisingly, Ohio has not modified the list of 
mitigating factors since it established them in the 1981 version of the statute.201 
Therefore, this Note proposes that Ohio add the following mitigating factor to be 
specifically enumerated in the statute: the extent that peer pressure and/or temperance 
influenced the offender’s commission of the offense. While gang involvement poses 
a high likelihood of peer pressure, this adaptation to the Ohio legislation would not 
prohibit the execution of gang members in its entirety. Amending the legislation would 
merely ensure that only the worst-of-the-worst offenders are sentenced to death by 
adding an additional mitigating factor considering outside influences. This factor 
would allow for the trier of fact to contemplate other external influences, which 
arguably can be compared to duress or coercion, in deciding whether an offender is 
deserving of capital punishment.  
The final legislative proposal, in the event that Ohio does not elect to raise the 
minimum age of eligibility to twenty-five, is to require an independent psychological 
and neurological examination of the offender. This requirement should be 
implemented in all cases in which the defendant was under the age of twenty-five at 
the time of the alleged offense. The independent examiner would perform scientific 
tests on the offender, similar to those elaborated upon in Part III.A.2., to gain a better 
understanding of the offender’s ability to anticipate future consequences, his or her 
ability to be influenced by antisocial peer pressure, and his or her temperance. The 
special consideration of these key psychological factors will better assist the trier of 
fact in assuring that the constitutional rights of the offender are not violated by the 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.202 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ohio’s death penalty statute, as it is currently imposed, inflicts severe and eternal 
punishment on the state’s less (or least) culpable offenders. With a national shift away 
from the use of the death penalty, evolving standards of decency are unveiling the 
problem of punishing such young and still-maturing offenders with death. These 
offenders, primarily characterized by their underdeveloped brain functions, do not 
think through the consequences of a criminal act in the same way that an older adult 
offender would. Thus, it is imperative that Ohio amends its death penalty statute before 
the lives of young adults, some of whom are capable of becoming productive members 
of society, are lost.  
This Note proposes that the Ohio legislature raise the age for capital punishment 
to twenty-five to ensure proper justice for younger Ohioans. Most significantly, new 
scientific research has exposed the lack of maturity amongst older adolescent and 
young adult brains. It has been proven that the human brain does not fully mature until 
a person is approximately twenty-five-years-old.203 The necessary areas of the 
prefrontal cortex, including the gray matter and white matter, are not mature until the 
 
200 Id. at § 2929.04(B). 
201 Id. at § 2929.04(B)(1)–(7). 
202 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
203 Cox, supra note 89. 
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mid-twenties.204 An individual’s ability to foresee future consequences is lacking in 
young adulthood, as is his temperance.205 Additionally, young adults are far more 
susceptible to antisocial peer pressure than older adults.206 Moreover, not only are the 
“evolving standards of decency”207 gradually growing to disfavor the use of the death 
penalty in its entirety,208 but several policy arguments exist as well to raise the 
minimum age. The United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child aimed to 
prohibit the use of the death penalty for all juveniles.209 While the United States has 
still yet to ratify this treaty, immense international support exists for cautioning 
legislatures from sentencing its youngest, least culpable offenders to death. Even the 
American Bar Association has recommended that the federal government raise the 
minimum age for the death penalty.210  
With all of the innovative scientific research arriving at the conclusion that human 
brains are not fully developed until the age of twenty-five, Ohio must carefully weigh 
that scientific evidence, along with the shifting public opinions and national and 
international policy, to modify its death penalty statute. Ohio has listened to science 
before with the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, so why not now? To ensure that 
only the worst-of-the-worst are deprived of a second chance at life, Ohio is urged to 
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